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that courts of equity will not grant relief to either party when such
party is seeking to protect a right operating against public policy.18
Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner conducted himself prop,erly in reference to the suit, and so he was barred from relief.
A. E. M.

CONTRACTS - ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION - NOT APPLICABLE
TO CONTRACTS FOR PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY.-Plaintiff corpora-

tion had given to the defendant trustees a mortgage which provided
that if plaintiff was not in default, the trustees would release from the
mortgage lien any lands sold by the plaintiff, on payment to them of a
stipulated percentage of the purchase price. The plaintiff, having
contracted to sell a certain parcel of land covered by the mortgage, re-

quested the trustees to execute the necessary release. Previous to
this contract of sale, the plaintiff had notified the trustees that it had
decided not to pay an installment of interest which was due at a future
date. Consequently, the trustees refused to execute the release, averring that they had treated plaintiff's threatened default as an anticipatory breach, and, therefore, they were no longer bound to perform
the contract according to its original tenor. In an action to compel
the defendant to execute the release, held, for plaintiff. The doctrine
of anticipatory repudiation does not apply to contracts for the payment of money only, in installments or otherwise. Indian River Corp.
v. Mfg.Trust, 253 App. Div. 549, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 860 (1st Dept.
1938).
This case is in accord with previous decisions in New York 1 and

in other jurisdictions. 2

The courts of this state undoubtedly recog-

and security the police power may be exercised in the manner against which the
protagonist of this motion lodges complaint."
'sSee note 15, supra.
1
McReady v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 400, 65 N. E. 208 (1902); Kelly v.
Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 N. E. 584 (1906) ; Werner v.
Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dept. 1915); Bauchle v.
Bauchle, 185 App. Div. 590, 173 N. Y. Supp. 292 (1st Dept. 1918); Curov
Realty Corp. v. Powell, 246 App. Div. 832, 284 N. Y. Supp. 846 (2d Dept.
1936).
'Kevan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719 (W. D. Mo.
1932) ; Manufacturer's Furniture Co. v. Cantrell, 172 Ark. 642, 290 S.W. 353
(1927); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Brown, 230 Ky. 534, 20 S. W. (2d) 284
(1929); see Alger-Fowler Co. v. Tracy, 98 Minn. 432, 437, 107 N. W. 1124,
1126 (1906).
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nize the right to treat 3 an anticipatory repudiation 4 of an executory
contract as a breach in three classes of contracts, namely: (1) contracts to marry; 5 (2) contracts for personal services; and (3) contracts for the manufacture or sale of goods.0 It has been said that

this doctrine, when applied at all, is applied with great caution, and
that in New York it has been recognized only in those three classes
enumerated above. 7 But the doctrine, has also been applied to an
agreement to hire a boat,8 to arbitration agreements, 9 and probably to
'The mere fact that one party to a contract, before the time for performance, unqualifiedly announces to the other his intention not to perform, assuming
the case to be one where the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation applies, does
not in itself constitute a breach of contract, but merely gives the innocent party
an option to, treat it as an immediate breach, or to ignore the repudiation until
the time for performance. As was said in Frost v. Knight, 7 Exch. 111
(1872): "The promisee, if he pleases, may treat the notice of intention as
inoperative, and await the time when the contract is to be executed, and then
hold the other party- responsible for all the consequences of non-performance;
but in that case he keeps the contract alive for the benefit of the other party
as well as his own; he remains subject to all his own obligations and liabilities
under it, and enables the other party not only to complete the contract, if so
advised, notwithstanding his previous repudiation of it, but also to take advantage of any supervening circumstance which would justify him in declining
to complete it." Accord: Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362 (1875); In re
Vaughan's Estate, 156 Misc. 577, 282 N. Y. Supp. 214 (1935), aff'd, 248 App.
Div. 730, 289 N. Y. Supp. 825 (2d Dept. 1936).
'The renunciation, in order to amount to an anticipatory -repudiation, must
be absolute and unequivocal and clearly indicate a permanent intention to
repudiate. National Contracting Co. v. Hudson River Water Power Co., 110
App. Div. 133, 97 N. Y. Supp. 92 (1st Dept. 1905) ; see 13 C. J. (1917) p. 654,
§727; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1933) § 318 N. Y. Annot.
'Since the abolition of actions for breach of promise in New York (N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. ACT § 61a-i), the application of the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation to this class of contracts, of course, has disappeared.
'Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246 (1870); Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y.
362 (1875); Windmuller v. Pope, 107 N. Y. 674, 14 N. E. 436 (1887); see
Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 19, 78 N. E. 584, 585
(1906).
The doctrine is based on one of the necessary implied terms of every
executory contract, that the parties shall continue to be ready and willing to
perform, the violation of which, by not being willing to perform, is regarded
as the breach.

CLARK, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 1931) 614.

'Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 19, 78 N. E. 584,
585 (1906); Booth v. Milliken, 127 App. Div. 522, 11 N. Y. Supp. 791 (lst
Dept. 1908), aff'd on other gromids, 194 N. Y. 553, 87 N. E. 115 (1909);
Adenaw v. Piffard, 202 N. Y. 122, 129, 95 N. E. 555, 557 (1911) ; Ga Nun v.
Palmer, 202 N. Y. 483, 493, 96 N. E. 99, 101 (1911) ; instant case at 551.
In some jurisdictions, the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation has been
rejected in its entirety. Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874) ; TerelU v.
Anderson, 244 Mass. 273, 138 N. E. 569 (1923); Carstens v. McDonald, 38
Neb. 853, 57 N. W. 757 (1894) ; King v. Waterman, 55 Neb. 324, 75 N. W.
830 (1898).
'Donovan v. Sheridan, 4 Misc. 433, 24 N. Y. Supp. 116 (1893).
'Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N. Y. 633, 52 N. E. 671 (1899),
where it was held that an immediate action for damages could be maintained
against the defendant, who, before the time for performance, by revoking the
submission, rendered it impossible for him to carry out the arbitration agreement.
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repudiations of contracts to devise or bequeath property so as to enable the promisee to maintain an action for damages during the life of
the promisor. 10
But since the doctrine is said to be limited to executory contracts " and somewhat arbitrarily to have no application to unilateral
contracts, 12 the courts have steadfastly refused to apply this doctrine
to unilateral contracts for the payment of money only.' 3 Thus, in the
instant case, since the only outstanding obligation under the bond of
the mortgage was the plaintiff's promise to pay money, there could be
Adenaw v. Piffard, 137 App. Div. 470, 121 N. Y. Supp. 825 (4th Dept.
1910), reeld on other grounds, 202 N. Y. 122, 95 N. E. 555 (1911), where the
question is expressly left undecided, the court refusing to pass on it; see
Ga Nun v. Palmer, 202 N. Y. 483, 490, 96 N. E. 99, 101 (1911), where the
court discusses the cases on anticipatory repudiation, apparently acquiescing in
its application, but then at page 493, states that whether it is applicable or not,
it leaves undetermined; 2 CLARK, NEW YORK LAW OF CONTRACTS (1922) 1477;
Notes (1912) 36 L. R. A. (N. s.) 922, (1930) 66 A. L. R. 1439.
It would seem that there could also be an anticipatory breach of a contract
to rent a theatre, Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N. Y. 354, 29 N. E. 255 (1891), and
of a contract to sell land, In re Vaughan's Estate, 156 Misc. 577, 282 N. Y.
Supp. 214 (1935), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 730, 289 N. Y. Supp. 825 (2d Dept.
1936), the courts deciding both cases on the ground that the plaintiffs had not
manifested their election to treat the repudiation as an anticipatory breach. See
Brakarsh v. Brown, 162 Misc. 412, 294 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1936), where the
court dismissed an action for an anticipatory breach of a contract to sell land,
on the ground that there was no allegation in the complaint of an unqualified
repudiation of the contract by the defendant; but the court intimated that had
the pleading been proper, the action would lie.
n13 C. J. (1917) p. 655, § 728; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs (1932) § 318,
subd. (3) ; 12 Am. JuR. (1938) p. 973.
" By an examination of the cases, it will be noted that no reason is assigned
for this limitation; in fact, courts of other jurisdictions have expressed their
view that this limitation is purely arbitrary. See Moore v. Security Trust and
Life Ins. Co., 168 Fed. 496, 505 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909), where Judge Van
Devanter in a dissenting opinion said: "I perceive no reason for believing that
the plaintiffs, by reason of having performed their part of the contract, are in
a less favorable position than if the contract was still executory as to them";
Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pacific R. R., 224 Fed. 485 (D. C. 1917);
Professor
O'Neil v. Supreme Council, 70 N. J. L. 410, 57 Atl. 463 (1904).
Williston's justification is as follows: "* * * when the only requirement of
the contract is the promisor's future performance, it more obviously is unjust
to hold him liable to an action immediately, than where performances are to be
rendered by both parties. In the latter case, waiting until the agreed time has
its effect on the whole agreed exchange; in the former case, allowing the
promisee immediate recovery is nothing but a direct bonus to the promisee
beyond what he was promised and a direct penalty to the promisor." 5 WiuLIsTON (Rev. ed. 1937) 3734.
See 12 Am. JUR. (1938) 973 and Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 460, for a
criticism and discussion of the rule that the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation
does not apply to unilateral contracts.
' See Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. at 377 (1875), where the court, speaking
of the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation, said: "* * * it would scarcely be
extended to mere promises to pay money, or other cases of that nature, where
there are no mutual stipulations"; Kevan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
1 F. Supp. 719 (W. D. Mo. 1932); 13 C. J. (1917) p. 655, §728; 12 Am. JuR.
(1938) 873.
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no default thereon until the actual time for payment arose. Previous
to this case, the doctrine had been held as not applicable to the payment of benefits under a contract of insurance, so as to subject the
insurance company, on its repudiation of the policy, to liability for
entire damages for breach of the contract; 14 nor to an anticipatory
repudiation by the maker of a promissory note, so as to make him
liable thereon before the actual time of payment. 15
However, if the contract, wherein the question of anticipatory
repudiation arises, is not solely for the payment of money, the doctrine still applies. Accordingly, where the defendant contracted to
market a razor patented by the plaintiff and to pay him a stipulated
royalty in yearly installments, it was held that the defendant's anticipatory repudiation subjected him to liability for the entire damages
sustained, on the ground that the contract was not one for the payment
of money only, but for the marketing of a patented razor as well. 16
Moreover, even though the contract is one where the promisee
is only to pay money, if the performance
remains mutually executory,
17
the doctrine should still apply.
L. J. G.
Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 79 N. E. 584
(1906), where an insurance company's act in wrongfully declaring the insured's
policy void was held not to give the insured an action for anticipatory breach,
the contract being one for the payment of money only; but that his proper
remedy was in equity; cf. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, discussed in note
16, infra.

'Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246, 250 (1870); cf. Hall v. Nassau
Consumers Ice Co., 260 N. -Y. 417, 183 N. E. 903 (1933).
The doctrine has been also held not applicable to unilateral contracts to pay
money in installments for support or during the life of a promisee. Werner v.
Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dept. 1915); Bauchle v.
Bauchle, 185 App. Div. 590, 173 N. Y. Supp. 292 (lst Dept. 1918) ; Edelman v.
Wechsler, 245 App. Div. 748, 280 N. Y. Supp. 259 (2d Dept. 1935). See
Villani v. National City Bank, 143 Misc. 416, 256 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1932),
where a bank, before the time for payment, refused to recognize plaintiff's bank
account,
and it was held that an action for anticipatory breach was not proper.
"0Baer v. Durham Duplex Razor Co., 228 App. Div. 350, 239 N. Y. Supp.
353 (1st Dept. 1930), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 570, 173 N. E. 870 (1930). The Appellate Division, at page 353, said: "The defendant further claims that there could
be no recovery, after the defendant's repudiation of the contract, for the entire
damages sustained by the breach, that the contract was one for the payment of
money only, and that the doctrine of anticipatory breach is not applicable. * * *
This is not a contract solely for the payment of money. * * * Here the defendant did not engage to make specific payments in installments, but to market
the razor. The plaintiff may well have been damaged by the defendant's refusal
to proceed far more than the amount of the minimum royalties, though these
minimum royalties constituted all the damages he could prove." Cf. Tannebaum v. Federal Match Co., 189 N. Y. 75, 81 N. E. 565 (1907).
" Equitable Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Western Pac. Ry., 244 Fed. 488, 501
(S. D. N. Y. 1917) ; Park v. Maryland Casualty Co., 59 F. (2d) 736 (W. D.
Mo. 1932). See Brearton v. Dewitt, 252 N. Y. 495, 170 N. E. 119 (1930),
where a complaint alleging that the defendant's testator failed to pay monthly
installments under a bilateral contract, wherein, in consideration for the payments, the plaintiff promised to isolate herself from her friends and to submit
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CONTRACT - DECEIT - AcCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD
PARTIE.-Plaintiff granted a loan to a factor in reliance upon a cer-

tified" balance sheet prepared by defendant, a firm of accountants. It
was contended that defendant, though aware that the balance sheet
would be used to obtain credit, failed (1) to verify fictitious accounts
fraudulently inserted by the factor and (2) to point out the stagnant
condition of, and the inadequate reserves for other accounts. It was
further claimed that thirty days later-after the loan had been made
-- defendant sent an accurate description of the latter condition to the
factor but no attempt was made to notify creditors. Plaintiff brought
an action for deceit against defendant for misrepresentation as to the
solvency of the factor. The Appellate Division affirmed a decision of
the trial court which set aside a verdict for plaintiff. Upon appeal,
held, reversed and new trial granted. A prima facie case in deceit
was established by evidence of gross negligence from which the jury
in the instant case would be authorized to infer fraud. State Street
Trust Co. v. Ernst,278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. (2d) 416 (1938).
Most of the early actions for deceit, like their modem counterparts, were brought when plaintiff was misled into some business venture by defendant's misrepresentation.' Since early common law the
elements of the action have remained substantially the same: 2 a false
statement of a material fact, 3 knowingly 4 made, which is intended to 5
and does induce the deceived to act to his detriment.6 Accountants
herself to the direction and control of the defendant for the treatment and cure
of certain disease, stated a cause of action, not only for the installment due at
the time of the testator's death, but also for entire damages for breach of the
contract. The decision can be justified on the ground that since the contract
was bilateral, the defendant's anticipatory breach gave the plaintiff an immediate
action for entire damages; cf. Werner v. Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154 N. Y.
Supp. 570 (1st Dept. 1915), where the court held that the non-payment of an
installment and repudiation by defendant under a unilateral contract, did not
entitle plaintiff to sue for damages for breach of the contract, but only to sue
for each installment as it fell due. Compare Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe,
12 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), noted with approval in 36- YALE L. J. 263
(where a recovery on an insurance policy which provided for specified weekly
payments, was allowed to include all installments, including those not due, on
the theory that the contract was not unilateral, but bilateral, since the insured
was required to furnish physician's report of her condition every thirty days)
with Kevan v. John Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719 (W. D. Mo. 193?).
'Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42
HARV. L. REv. 733.
2 EDGAR AND EDGAR, TORTS (3d ed. 1936) 178-187.
'Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. Leach, 247 N. Y. 1, 159 N. E. 700 (1928);
Moore v. Abbey, 213 App. Div. 787, 210 N. Y. Supp. 766 (4th Dept. 1925).
'Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919); Rose v. Goodale, 169
N. Y. Supp. 446 (1918).
'Habeeb v. Dass, 111 Misc. 437, 181 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1920), aff'd, 196
App. Div. 974, 188 N. Y. Supp. 925 (2d Dept. 1921).
'Laska v. Harris, 215 N. Y. 554, 109 N. E. 599 (1915) (defendant's deceit
need not be the sole inducing cause) ; Mahon v. Equitable Trust Co., 181 App.
Div. 335, 168 N. Y. Supp. 757 (1st Dept. 1918); EDGAR AND EDGAR, 10c. cit.
supra note 2.

